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Abstract
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of budget forecast manipulations on election
results using a sample that covers all 308 Portuguese municipalities over the period running
from 1998 to 2017. The results reveal that incumbent mayors overestimate revenues
and expenditures. Overstating the budget more on the revenue side, they end up with
a deficit. We check whether this opportunistic behavior is electorally beneficial. The
results provide little or no evidence that election-year manipulations of revenue forecasts
affect the vote shares of the parties of the incumbent mayors. On the other hand, the
opportunistic management of total and capital expenditure forecasts pays off, which is
consistent with previous results for Portugal indicating that increased total and, mainly,
capital expenditures lead to higher vote shares.
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The literature on the political economy of fiscal forecasting shows that governments tend to
overestimate revenues for election years. For non-election years the incentives are mixed, de-
pending on the government’s motives. Nevertheless, a higher degree of overestimation can be
expected when reelection is more uncertain (Bischoff and Gohout, 2010).
Several studies find evidence supporting this hypothesis (Boylan, 2008; Bischoff and Go-
hout, 2010; Anessi-Pessina and Sicilia, 2015; Boukari and Veiga, 2019). For example, Boylan
(2008) finds an important political influence: budgets in the year ending right before an election
or starting before an election tend to be based on optimistic forecasts. Likewise, comparing
French and Portuguese local governments, Boukari and Veiga (2019) find that budget forecasts
are biased (though seem to have been more cautious in French departments than in Portuguese
municipalities). They also find that these biases are essentially driven by electoral motiva-
tions and institutional differences. However, there is much less evidence about the electoral
consequences of budget forecast manipulations.
The purpose of this paper is thus to check whether fiscal forecast manipulation is a winning
strategy for a politician. Specifically, we investigate the impact of budget forecast manipulations
on the electoral fortunes of Portuguese mayors. To the best of our knowledge, only Benito et al.
(2016) tested this hypothesis, using Spanish municipal data.
An important related question is that of the mechanism behind this relationship. There is
a multitude of channels by which incumbent governments can enhance their reelection chances
through budget forecasting. We here discuss two channels: overestimate revenues or under-
estimate budget deficits. On one side, oversestimating revenues creates room for maneuver,
even in the presence of Budget Balance Rules (Boylan, 2008; Benito et al., 2013). Thus, the
government can plan higher expenditures in election year. As more spending might have real
economic consequences, such as lower unemployment rates or larger transfer payments, this
can increase the reelection chances, in particular if voters are fiscal liberals.
On the other side, the government can underestimate the budget deficit in order to show
its competence. Incumbents can underestimate forecasts in order to downplay overall spending
increases and demonstrate that they are responsible managers of the public purse (Rodgers and
Joyce, 1996). In addition, pessimistic revenue forecasts may provide a cushion for unexpected
expansionary fiscal policies especially if voters are fiscal conservatives.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing the impact of budget forecast manipula-
tions on the vote shares obtained by Portuguese mayors. To this end, we use both the aggregate
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and the disaggregated data, with two advantages in comparison with Benito et al. (2016). First,
we can evaluate the overall impact of budget manipulation. Second, the disaggregated data
helps to identify the driving component of the overall impact.
To anticipate our main results, we find that incumbent mayors overestimate revenues and
expenditures. With greater overestimations on the revenue side, they end up with budget
deficits in election years. The estimation results do not provide a robust indication that election-
year opportunistic manipulations of revenue forecasts affect the vote shares of the parties of
the incumbent mayors. But, on the other hand, we obtain robust results which support the
hypothesis that strategic manipulation of total and capital expenditures is associated with
higher vote shares. This is consistent with previous results for Portugal (Veiga and Veiga,
2007b; Aidt et al., 2011), which indicate that higher total, and especially, capital expenditures
in election years pay off in terms of increased vote shares for the party of the incumbent mayor.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the background literature.
Section 3 describes the institutional environment of Portuguese municipalities and provides
details of the sample, variables and empirical analysis. Section 4 shows the effects of budget
forecast manipulations on election results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
This paper relates to the literature on the political economy of fiscal forecasts. Although there
is no cohesive theoretical approach for analyzing budget forecasts, we build on a comprehensive
literature dating back to the Political Business Cycle theory.
The Political Business Cycle theory, introduced by Nordhaus (1975), formalizes the com-
mon perception that politicians use expansionary economic policies in a pre-election period
to enhance their chances of re-election. Opportunistic politicians are primarily interested in
retaining office. When they face an electorate that prefers high growth and low unemployment,
politicians may use expansionary fiscal or monetary polices to create a short term economic
boom before and during the election campaign. Naive voters are unable to understand the
politician’s manipulation of the economy and its adverse future effects. On the contrary, they
enjoy the boom and re-elect the politician. This approach faced many critics, notably the lack
of empirical support (see Drazen, 2000).
Nordhaus’ approach was later refined by a number of scholars to incorporate rational ex-
pectations and emphasize the presence of uncertainty regarding the the competence level of
policymakers (see Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). Moreover, the analysis was shifted
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from macroeconomic variables to fiscal ones, giving rise to the Political Budget Cycles (PBC).
This is because macroeconomic variables are not really subject to direct government control,
while taxes or transfers (economic policy instruments) are more easily controlled and manipu-
lated. In fact, if a cycle really exists, it should be found not in the results of economic policy,
but in the instruments of economic policy (Dubois, 2016).
Hence, the Political Budget Cycles literature studies the relationships between fiscal vari-
ables (public spending, taxes, budget deficits) and the electoral calendar. The basic assumption
in this strand of literature is that politicians opportunistically manipulate fiscal policy instru-
ments to achieve electoral goals. Therefore, one can question how this is possible in a rational
expectation framework?
The answer resides in the fact that, although, voters are rational, there are information
asymetries between them and the government, and this allows the emergence of political cycles.
In these models, signaling or mozal hazard are the driving forces behind the PBC (Rogoff, 1990;
Shi and Svensson, 2006)1. For example, Shi and Svensson (2006) show in their moral hazard
model that politicians may behave opportunistically even if most voters know the government’s
policy, but some voters are uninformed. The larger the number of voters that fail (ex ante)
to identify election-motivated fiscal policy manipulations, the more the incumbent profits from
boosting expenditures before an election.
Political Budget Cycles take many forms. Instead of increasing public spending, deficit or
debt, the incumbent can reduce taxes immmediately prior to elections. Another practice con-
sists in manipulating budget projections to enhance reelection chances (Chatagny and Soguel,
2012; Bischoff and Gohout, 2010). Brück and Stephan (2006) name this as ‘Political Forecast
Cycle’, and they argue that governments will attempt to introduce more popular measures im-
mediately before an election, whereas less popular measures will be implemented immediately
after an election. For example, a government may increase spending prior to an election and
hide the emerging budget deficit from the electorate until polls close, so exploiting temporary
information asymmetries.
Chatagny and Soguel (2012) argue that incumbents create buffers by underestimating tax
revenue in order to put pressure on expenditure, and subsequently create a revenue windfall,
thereby reducing the deficit. Furthermore, they suggest, without testing it explicitly, that the
creation of a precautionary buffer may be subsequently used to increase expenditure in an
election year.
In line with competence showing, Jochimsen and Lehmann (2017) argue that the overes-
1see de Haan and Klomp (2013) for a review.
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timation of future tax revenues can be viewed as a way of disguising an explicit deficit. In
fact, overestimating tax revenues opens up two main strategies for the incumbent government.
First, it might plan larger expenditures or lower taxes, keeping estimated deficits constant. Or,
second, it might keep planned expenditures and tax rates constant and reduce the estimated
deficit.
Several studies find evidence giving support to the ‘Political Forecast Cycle’ hypothesis
(Boylan, 2008; Bischoff and Gohout, 2010; Anessi-Pessina and Sicilia, 2015; Boukari and Veiga,
2019). For example, Boylan (2008) finds an important political influence: budgets in the year
ending right before an election or starting before an election tend to be based on optimistic
forecasts. Likewise, comparing French and Portuguese local governments, Boukari and Veiga
(2019) find that budget forecasts are biased (though seem to have been more cautious in
French departments than in Portuguese municipalities). They also find that these biases are
essentially driven by electoral motivations and institutional differences. However, there is much
less evidence about the electoral consequences of budget forecast manipulations.
Bischoff and Gohout (2010) hold that governments can increase their re-election probability
by forecasting higher expenditures in the election years. They argue that the government’s
ability to increase expenditures or avoid cuts in the election years is greater if it has under-
estimated taxes in the preceding years. They add that biased forecasts allow governments to
increase expenditures in election years, especially if there is no legal punishment or a durable
popularity decline when forecasts turn out not to be tenable.
Benito et al. (2016) provide evidence that politicians create buffers by underestimating
tax revenue, thereby reducing (increasing) fiscal deficits (surpluses) in the preceding years,
to increase expenditure in the pre-election and election years. Their estimates reveal that
tax revenue underestimation two years before elections influences the mayor’s party reelection
prospects positively.
Besides the opportunistic approach, there are models based on the idea that partisan politics
matters (Hibbs, 1977). According to Hibbs (1977), politicians use the economy to carry out
their ideological objectives. It is commonly assumed that left-wing parties favor public spending
increases while right-wing parties aim at budget reductions. Therefore, the government political
ideology may also impact budget manipulation (Benito et al., 2016).
Other scholars build on the weak government hypothesis and presume that the level of
political fragmentation may also influence the manipulation of budget forecasts (Goeminne
et al., 2008; Jochimsen and Lehmann, 2017). Goeminne et al. (2008) suggest that government
fragmentation leads to more optimistic revenue forecasts. Jochimsen and Lehmann (2017) find
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strong support for partisan politics. Left-wing governments seem to produce more optimistic
or less pessimistic tax revenue forecasts than right-wing ones do.
Coalition governments face higher deficits than majority or no-coalition governments be-
cause the former, weakened by internal conflicts, are influenced by interest groups. This leads
to spending increases (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). Furthermore, unlike single-party governments,
coalition parties must make more promises, the toll for temporary or permanent backings. In
other words, single-party and majority governments can afford to be unpopular if necessary
and still hope to win elections later (Brück and Stephan, 2006). Therefore, promises and fore-
casts would be more consistent in single-party or majority governments, representing minor
deviations in the budget.
Empirics show mixed results regarding the impact of the weak governement hypothesis on
budget forecasts. Goeminne et al. (2008) show that two-party governments are more optimistic
in their revenue projections than single-party governments. However, governments with at least
three parties are less optimistic than single- party or two-party governments. Contrary to the
theoretical prediction based on the ”common pool” problem, Jochimsen and Lehmann (2017)
find that more fragmented governments and parliaments tend to produce more pessimistic or
less optimistic tax revenue forecasts. One reason might be that at least one of the incumbents
will stay in office and will be part of the next government.
3 Empirical setting
3.1 Legal and Institutional framework
This section presents the legal and institutional environment within which Portuguese munici-
palities operate. Portugal is a unitary and centralized country with three levels of governement:
the central government, regional governments in the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira,
and 308 municipalities (278 in the mainland, 19 in Azores and 11 in Madeira). All municipal-
ities, regardless of location, share the same institutional structure and are governed by the
same laws and financial regime. With this common regime, the municipalities are financially
autonomous and can, without authorization from a higher-ranked authority, define their own
budgets, collect the revenues they are entitled to by law and allocate expenditures.
The central government has delegated a number of competencies to the municipalities,
namely the promotion of local economic development and territorial organization, as well as the
provision of several public goods related to water and sewage, energy, transportation, housing,
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healthcare, education, culture, sports, environmental protection and public order.
Concerning the institutional structure, Portuguese municipalities have two representative
branches : the Town Council (Câmara Municipal), which holds the executive power, and the
Municipal Assembly, the deliberative branch. The latter approves the general framework for
local policies and the municipal budgets and accounts, while the Town Council is responsible
for their elaboration and implementation. In the last quarter of each year, the Town Council
submits a plan of activities and a budget for approval by the Municipal Assembly. Although the
latter has the power to reject those documents, it is not allowed to introduce amendments to
them. The members of both chambers are elected by the registered voters of each municipality
for a four-year term (Boukari and Veiga, 2019).2
While all members of the Town Council are elected directly by voters, half plus one of the
members of the Municipal Assembly are elected directly, and the others are the presidents of
the parishes that belong to the municipality.3 The leader of the most voted list for the Town
Council becomes the mayor. All the councilors are elected for four years. Besides presiding the
Town Council and choosing which executive competencies are delegated to other elected mem-
bers,4 the mayor has ample autonomy regarding human resource management, authorization
of contracts, and allocation of financial resources. Additionally, the mayor’s party generally
holds a majority of deputies in both the Town Council and Municipal Assembly, making the
budgets proposed by the mayor’s team easy to approve. Although mayors have ample auton-
omy regarding the allocation of resources, most municipalities have limited ability to raise own
revenues and are, therefore, dependent on transfers from the central government.5
Until the 2005 municipal elections, mayors could run for another term without any legal
limit on the number of previous terms in office. Hence, some have held office since the very
first elections in December 1976. These prolonged time in office generated some discussions
that ultimately led, in 2005, to the imposition of a three-term limit to every municipal office
holder (Castro and Martins, 2013).
2The elections for both chambers, and those for the parish assemblies, are concurrent and take place in all
municipalities at the same time. Voters cast their votes in party or independent closed lists, and votes are
transformed into mandates using the Hondt method.
3The parish president is the leader of the most voted list for the Parish Assembly.
4Usually, only the Town Council’s members (vereadores) that belong to the mayor’s party receive delegated
executive competencies.
5Portuguese municipalities can obtain loans, but medium to long term debt (over one year) can only be
used to fund investment expenditures. The current limit on municipal gross debt corresponds to 1.5 times the
average current revenues of the last three years.
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3.2 Data
To investigate the impact of budget forecast manipulations on electoral outcomes, we use a
panel data set including all 308 Portuguese municipalities over the period 1998-2017. During
the period of this study, five municipal elections (2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017) occured in
Portugal, generally in October.
Data on municipal finances was gathered from the Directorate General of Local Governments
(DGAL). Political variables come from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The source of economic
and demographic variables is the National Institute of Statistics (INE).
The dataset compiled is clearly suitable for the purpose of this paper. First, all Portuguese
municipalities operate under the same institutional framework. Second, the local governments
decide autonomously on the projected fiscal resources and expenses they use in the budgetary
process. In addition, some authors suggest that local governements are the suitable level to test
PBC theories. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) argue that voters evaluate incumbent’s abilities through
the efficiency achieved in the provision of public goods. Based upon this argument, Veiga and
Veiga (2007a) suggest that sub-national governments have more capacity to influence voters,
because their powers impact directly on citizens’ quality of life (education, security, waste
collection, etc.), rather than national duties such as national defence, exterior relationships or
judicial administration.
Like Boukari and Veiga (2019), we measure the forecast manipulation by the Percent Fore-
cast Error (PFE) indicator:
PFEx,t =
(Ax,t − Fx,t) ∗ 100
Ax,t
(1)
where x is the analyzed budget segment (revenues, expenditures or a part of them), and
PFE is the Percent Forecast Error. A refers to actual or real figures in the budget. F stands
for the forecasted value, i.e. the original budget.
This indicator gives information about the direction and the extent of the bias. On the
revenue side, a positive PFE corresponds to an under-estimate or conservative forecast and a
negative PFE to an optimistic forecast. The opposite stands on the expense side. Moreover, an
under-estimation of revenues (PFE > 0) represents a favorable variance and an overestimation
means an unfavorable variance in the annual report (Mayper et al., 1991).
In this paper, we consider the main components of the municipal budget (Total effective
revenue, i.e. revenue excluding loans and total expenditure) and their main sub-components.
On the revenue side, we consider current and capital revenue, and also emphasize direct taxes
(which are part of current revenue). Municipal current revenues include taxes, fees and penal-
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ties, property income, current transfers from the central government or the European Union,
sales of good and services, and other current revenues. Capital revenues include the sale of
investment goods (e.g., real estate), capital transfers, financial assets and liabilities, and other
capital revenues. Direct taxes are part of current revenues, and their main components are
property taxes, taxes on the sale of property, a surcharge on corporate income taxes, and
vehicle taxes.
On the expenditure side, two components are taken into account: current expenditure and
capital expenditure. Current expenditures include wages, purchases of goods and assets, inter-
est payments, transfer payments, subsidies, and other current expenditures. Capital expendi-
tures include investments (by far, the most important component), capital transfer payments,
expenditures with financial assets and liabilities, and other capital expenditures.
The descriptive statistics for election years and mayors running for reelection are provided
in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Concerning the PFE, we note that there is overestimation of
both revenues and expenditures. For example, the average PFE for total revenue (excluding
loans) is −54.52% and for total expenditure it is −48.87%. Overall, there is evidence of opti-
mistic revenue and pessimistic expenditure forecasts. Altogether, the calculations show that,
on average, the forecasts of total revenue and of the other budget components exceed actual
outcomes.
Regarding control variables, roughly 55% of the incumbent mayors are reelected. In 4 out
of 5 cases, incumbent mayors have a majority in both the Town Council and the Municipal
Assembly. On average, mayors in our sample have been in office for at least two terms and 42%
of them are from the same party as the central government.
3.3 Method
The empirical analysis is carried out in two steps. First, we run the mean difference test over
several groups (election vs. nonelection years, year before election vs. other years, run for
reelection vs. lame-ducks, reelected vs. non-reelected mayors). In the second step, we test the
following hypothesis: election-year forecast manipulations increase vote shares for incumbent
mayors.
Notice that the vote shares obtained have consequences on the ability to govern. Concretely,
they determine if the government is single party or a coalition and, in the case of the latter, the
relative strength of the mayor’s party in the government coalition. Even when the incumbent’s
party does not win the elections, the vote share obtained determines its ability to be part of
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the ruling coalition or to constrain the actions of the winner. Thus, we analyze the effect of
budget manipulations on the vote share of the party of the incumbent mayor.
With the main variables of interest being the election-year percentage forecast error, we
estimate the following model (equation 2):
V otesit = β0 + β1PFEit +X
′
itΓ + β10Wmit−1 + ζi + ψit (2)
where V otesit is the vote share obtained by the party of the incumbent mayor. Xit is a
vector of control variables (Left, Majority, Terms in Office, Unemp, Rgdpg, Budget Stress (Bs)
and Dens).
Left is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the mayor belongs to a left-wing party and
0 otherwise. This variable captures the partisan effect. According to Hibbs (1977), politicians
use the economy to carry out their ideological objectives. We have no prior on the sign of the
variable Left.
Majority takes the value 1 if the mayor’s party holds a majority of deputies in both the
Town Council and in the Municipal Assembly, and equals zero otherwise. With this variable,
we test the impact of the government’s political strength. As having majority eases passing
bills, we expect a positive sign of the coefficient of this variable.
Terms in Office is the number of mandates the mayor of municipality i has been in office.
We expect that this variable reduces the vote share of the incumbent’s party because popularity
tends to erode with time in office.
Although debate continues as to the underlying mechanism driving economic voting, there
is a general consensus that economic evaluations play an important role in the vote calculus
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008). Therefore, some additional economic variables are also
added as controls, namely the unemployment rate (Unemp), regional GDP growth (Rgdpg),
Budget Stress (Bs) and population density (Dens).
In addition, we add the win margin in the previous election. This variable picks up unob-
served factors such as the mayor’s personal characteristics, as well as party affiliations of voters.
We expect persistence in voter preferences (and thus in voting behavior) and predict that its
coefficient is positive.
The full linear panel data model can be written as:
V otesit = β0 + β1PFEit + β2Leftit + β3Majorityit + β4TiOit + β5Govpartyit
+ β6Unempit−1 + β7Rgdpgrit−1 + β8Bsit−1 + β9Densit + β10Wmit−1 + ζi + ψit
(3)
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where ζi are municipal fixed effects and ψit is the error term. β0 to β10 are parameters to
be estimated.
Since we wish to check if budget manipulations pay off at the polls, the regressions are ran
only for election years and mayors running for reelection. We restrict the sample to mayors
running for reelection because they are the ones who are most interested in winning the elections.
Thus, their budget formulations need to be influenced by electoral considerations.
Given the fact that the set of cross-sectional units (municipalities) is not randomly selected,
a fixed effects model is preferred. Thus, we first run our regressions using the fixed effects
estimator, clustering standard errors at the municipality level. But, since some of our explana-
tory variables might be endogenous, our coefficient estimates might be biased. We take this
possibility into account by running IV-regressions.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Difference of means tests
The results reported in Table 1 indicate that all revenue and expenditure items are overesti-
mated, as the mean PFEs are always negative. When comparing election to non-election years,
the difference of means is statistically significant, with a positive sign, for capital revenues,
indicating that these tend to be especially overestimated in election years, which is consistent
with the results of Boukari and Veiga (2019), indicating opportunistic management of revenue
forecasts. As for expenditure items, the overestimation is significantly smaller in election years.
A reduced overestimation is consistent with a greater execution rate, that is, with increased
spending in election years. Thus, the difference of means tests also indicate opportunistc be-
havior regarding expenditure forecasts.
Table 1: Difference of means test over Election years
Non-election-years Election-years Difference
PFE-Effective Revenue -53.89 -54.16 0.27
PFE Current Revenue -13.36 -12.36 -1.00
PFE-Capital Revenue -181.79 -207.42 25.63***
PFE-Direct taxes -6.62 -4.73 -1.89
PFE-Total Expenditure -53.69 -48.81 -4.89***
PFE-Current Expenditure -16.18 -13.43 -2.75***
PFE-Capital Expenditure -112.21 -104.40 -7.81**
Observations 4303 1519
In Table 2, we compare the year before election to the first two years of the same electoral
11
cycle (the election year is excluded). Since none of the difference of means is statistically
significant, mayors seem to forecast revenues and expenditures similarly in the first three years
of the electoral cycle. That is, as shown in Table 1 the opportunistic forecast manipulation
seems to happen only in the election year.
Table 2: Difference of means - Year before Election vs. First 2 Years
First two years Year before Election Difference
PFE-Effective Revenue -54.37 -53.00 -1.37
PFE Current Revenue -13.32 -13.44 0.12
PFE-Capital Revenue -184.92 -176.01 -8.91
PFE-Direct taxes -6.91 -6.07 -0.85
PFE-Total Expenditure -53.64 -53.79 0.15
PFE-Current Expenditure -15.82 -16.88 1.06
PFE-Capital Expenditure -111.98 -112.66 0.68
Observations 2792 1511
When comparing municipalities of mayors who run for reelection with those of lame-duck
mayors in Table 3, we note that the overestimation of expenditures (over the entire term) tends
to be smaller for mayors who run for reelection. Although this appears consistent with greater
spending by those mayors, they seem to undertake a smaller overestimation of revenues, which
would not be consistent with opportunistic behavior. In Table 4 we restrict the sample to elec-
tion years, to check if running or not for reelection makes a difference in terms of opportunistic
forecasting. There is some indication that it may matter, as total effective revenues and receipts
from direct taxes tend to be more overestimated by mayors who run for reelection. All in all,
this section indicates that Portuguese mayors manage budget forecasts opportunistically, as
shown by Boukari and Veiga (2019).
Table 3: Difference of means test over Run for reelection
Not Run for reelection Run for reelection Difference
PFE-Effective Revenue -55.64 -53.45 -2.19
PFE Current Revenue -15.43 -12.38 -3.05***
PFE-Capital Revenue -202.79 -184.27 -18.52**
PFE-Direct taxes -9.68 -5.04 -4.63**
PFE-Total Expenditure -54.51 -51.74 -2.77*
PFE-Current Expenditure -18.14 -14.63 -3.51***
PFE-Capital Expenditure -117.00 -108.10 -8.91***
Observations 1325 4488
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Table 4: Difference of means test over Run for reelection (election years only)
Not Run for reelection Run for reelection Difference
PFE-Effective Revenue -49.78 -55.21 5.44*
PFE Current Revenue -12.29 -12.31 0.02
PFE-Capital Revenue -223.84 -203.11 -20.73
PFE-Direct taxes -1.81 -5.31 3.50*
PFE-Total Expenditure -46.45 -49.32 2.86
PFE-Current Expenditure -14.62 -13.07 -1.55
PFE-Capital Expenditure -100.80 -105.23 4.42
Observations 312 1204
4.2 Do budget forecast manipulations pay off?
The fixed effects estimation results of the model of Equation 3 are presented in Table 5. The
main variable of interest is the budget forecast bias of the election year. The first three columns
deal of municipal revenue forecast errors. In column (1), we consider only the PFE of Total
Effective revenue. Then, current and capital revenues are considered in column (2), and column
(3) replaces current revenues with direct taxes (which are part of them). Columns (4) and (5)
deal with municipal expenditures, with the PFE of Total Expenditures being considered in
column (4), and those of current and capital expenditures in column (5). Finally, in column
(6), we include the PFEs for Total Effective Revenues and for Total Expenditures. As indicated
above, the sample is restricted to election years and to the mayors who ran for reelection.
The results in Table 5 indicate that revenue forecast manipulation has little or no effects
on the vote shares of the party of the incumbent mayor. The PFE of Effective revenue is only
marginally statistically significant in column (1), but not in column (6), and the PFEs of revenue
components (current, capital, and direct taxes) are never statistically significant. The positive
coefficient in column (1) indicates that higher PFEs (underestimations) of Effective revenues
lead to higher vote shares. Conversely, opportunistic overestimations (PFE < 0) of revenues
would lead to lower vote shares. Overall, since there is only a marginally statistically significant
coefficient in column (1) and insignificance in the other estimations, it is safer to conclude that
there is no robust empirical evidence that election-year revenue forecast manipulations affect
vote shares.
Regarding the results for PFEs in expenditures, the PFE of Total Expenditures is sta-
tistically significant in columns (4) and (6), and that of capital expenditures is statistically
significant in column (5). The positive signs of the estimated coefficients indicate that underes-
timations (PFE > 0) of total and capital expenditures are associated with higher vote shares
for the party of the incumbent mayor. Thus, optimistic, and opportunistic, manipulations of
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capital expenditures seem to pay off at the polls.
Table 5: Impact of forecast errors on the vote shares of incumbents (Fixed Effect estimation)
Dependent variable Vote shares of the party of the incumbent mayor
Municipal Revenues Expenditures Rev. & Exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PFE Effective revenue 0.015* -0.002
(0.008) (0.012)
PFE Current revenue 0.007
(0.017)
PFE Capital revenue -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
PFE Direct taxes 0.006
(0.009)
PFE Total expenditure 0.025*** 0.027**
(0.008) (0.012)
PFE Current expenditure 0.004
(0.020)
PFE Capital expenditure 0.010***
(0.004)
Left wing 2.424** 2.520** 2.524** 2.297* 2.178* 2.404*
(1.216) (1.214) (1.215) (1.240) (1.256) (1.248)
Majority 0.127 0.057 0.099 0.032 0.044 -0.020
(1.069) (1.067) (1.075) (1.062) (1.060) (1.059)
Terms in office -0.903*** -0.953*** -0.955*** -1.034*** -1.039*** -1.035***
(0.277) (0.278) (0.275) (0.274) (0.273) (0.278)
Government party -2.056** -2.021** -2.003** -2.316** -2.217** -2.270**
(0.937) (0.942) (0.940) (0.926) (0.933) (0.927)
Unemployment rate -0.255 -0.217 -0.222 -0.404** -0.364** -0.364**
(0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.177) (0.174) (0.179)
Regional GDP growth 0.027 0.037 0.040 0.004 0.004 0.009
(0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080)
Budget stress -0.027 -0.015 -0.015 -0.021 -0.019 -0.022
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Population density -2.094 -3.925 -3.763 -0.301 -1.197 0.600
(5.042) (4.984) (4.999) (5.110) (5.041) (5.048)
Win Margin in the previous election 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.320*** 0.314***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Observations 1176 1177 1177 1155 1155 1153
Adjusted-R2 0.0673 0.0631 0.0633 0.0763 0.0764 0.0707
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity
in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
These results are in line with previous findings of Veiga and Veiga (2007b) and Aidt et al.
(2011), who show that increased total and capital expenditures in election years lead to greater
vote shares for the incumbents. Since municipalities are required to balance their budgets, they
overestimate revenues in election years in order to create room for maneuver (Benito et al.,
2013; Bischoff and Gohout, 2010), to expand expenditures. As discussed above, there is lttle or
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no evidence that the overestimation of revenues is penalized by voters. Therefore, their strategy
seems to pay off.
Concerning the results for the control variables, it appears that left-wing incumbents reveive
from 2.18 to 2.52 percentage points (p.p.) more of vote shares than their right-wing counterparts
or independents. Having a majority in the Town Council and in the Municipal Assembly does
not seem to affect vote shares. More terms in office has the expected cost of ruling negative
effect, and belonging to the same party as the central government also leads to lower vote
shares. An additional term in office reduces the vote shares by about 1 percentage point, while
belonging to the government’s party makes incumbents lose around 2 p.p. of votes. Regarding
the win margin in the previous election, the results indicate that mayors who benefited from
greater victory margins also tend to, on average, perform (3 p.p.) better than those who won
closer races.
Economic and demographic control variables tend to have non significant impact on the
vote shares. This may be due to the fact that mayors have less control over these variables.
Castro and Martins (2013) find that local economic conditions matter more than the national
or regional economic environment on the reelection chances. In fact, municipal unemployment
is the only economic variable that turns out statistically significant, in columns (4) to (6),
with the negative sign indicating (as expected) that voters penalize incumbents for higher
unemployment.
Robustness checks
So far, we have not accounted for the possibility that some of our explanatory variables are
endogenous and that our coefficient estimates might therefore be biased. Evidence presented,
for instance, in Boukari and Veiga (2019) suggests that the forecast error might be endogenous
to election results. Table 6 thus reports the same set of regressions as before, but we now use
a panel IV estimator and instrument the forecast error variables with their own lags.
The IV panel model is specified as a fixed effects model. Using the command xtivreg2 in
Stata, we invoke the cluster and the GMM-option to generate coefficient estimates that are
efficient in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlations. We also
report the Hansen-Sargan test on over-identifying restrictions. Finding an insignificant test
statistic, as is the case for all our specifications, implies that the Null hypothesis that the
instruments used are valid cannot be rejected.
Regarding our variables of interest, the results are consistent to those in Table 5. The main
differences are that the PFE of Effective revenue has a higher level of statistical significance
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Table 6: Impact of forecast errors on the vote shares of incumbents (IV estimation)
Dependent variable Vote shares of the party of the incumbent mayor
Municipal Revenues Expenditures Rev. & Exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PFE Effective Revenue 0.0669*** -0.0645
(0.0159) (0.0525)
PFE Current revenue 0.107***
(0.0385)
PFE Capital revenue 0.000431 0.00122
(0.00301) (0.00323)
PFE Direct taxes 0.0603*
(0.0348)
PFE Total expenditure 0.0651*** 0.138**
(0.0179) (0.0634)
PFE Current expenditure -0.0139
(0.0541)
PFE Capital expenditure 0.0383**
(0.0162)
Left wing 1.833 2.049* 2.294* 2.561** 0.188 2.535**
(1.193) (1.195) (1.225) (1.256) (1.564) (1.272)
Majority 0.128 -0.241 0.355 -0.573 -1.857 -1.098
(1.086) (1.077) (1.103) (1.123) (1.383) (1.150)
Terms in office -0.564** -0.666** -0.764*** -0.868*** -0.716* -1.056***
(0.282) (0.277) (0.270) (0.289) (0.416) (0.316)
Government party -2.017** -1.901* -1.731* -2.566*** -1.692 -2.734***
(0.955) (0.970) (0.947) (0.983) (1.264) (1.006)
Unemployment rate -0.435** -0.314* -0.329* -0.517*** -0.298 -0.441**
(0.179) (0.179) (0.186) (0.187) (0.242) (0.205)
Regional GDP growth -0.0311 -0.0325 0.0225 -0.0538 -0.0994 0.00345
(0.0812) (0.0831) (0.0812) (0.0833) (0.107) (0.0889)
Budget stress -0.0702* -0.0381 -0.0261 -0.0585 -0.0736 -0.0612
(0.0383) (0.0375) (0.0348) (0.0376) (0.0488) (0.0395)
Population density 3.155 -4.888 -2.693 4.116 5.694 5.289
(5.136) (4.959) (5.329) (5.431) (6.992) (5.461)
Win Margin in the previous election 0.319*** 0.320*** 0.310*** 0.309*** 0.322*** 0.341***
(0.0577) (0.0579) (0.0567) (0.0618) (0.0831) (0.0670)
Hansen J 2 4 2 5 3 6
Hansen P-value 0.30 0.16 0.38 0.59 0.62 0.53
Notes: Instrumental variables regressions with fixed effects with standard errors clustered by municipality.
Rubust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
(column 1), and those for Current expenditures (column 2) and Direct taxes (column 3) are
now statistically significant. Although there seems to be a stronger indication that the under-
estimation (PFE > 0) of revenues leads to higher vote shares, the PFE for Effective revenues
is not statistically significant when included alongside the PFE for Total expenditure (column
6). As happened in Table 5, When the PFE for revenues and expenditures are included in
the same estimation, only the latter is statistically significant. Since the results for PFEs in
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expenditures are practically the same as in Table 5, there is further support for the hypothesis
that opportunistic underestimation (PFE > 0) of total and capital expenditures pay off (lead
to higher vote shares).
The results for the the control variables are very similar to those obtained in Table 5.
Again, vote shares are positively related to left-wing incumbents and to larger win margins in
the previous elections. More terms in office, party similarity with the national government, and
higher unemployment rates are associated with lower vote shares.
As an additional robustness test, we run the estimations of Table 5 excluding the elections
which occurred in recession years (2009 and 2013). We do this because the reduction of mu-
nicipal revenues in election years may reduce the margin of maneuver for the mayor to behave
opportunistically. Another reason is that unanticipated recessions (or stronger than expected)
may lead to unusually high overestimations of revenues. The results, shown in Table B.2 in
the Appendix, are very similar to those of Table 5, except for the fact that no PFE variable is
statistically significant in column (6).
Another robustness check consists of restricting the sample to the period until the 2009 elec-
tions, that is, before term limits to Portuguese mayors became binding. The results, reported
in Table B.3 in the Appendix, are also very similar to those of Table 5. As happened in Table
B.2, no PFE variable is statistically significant in column (6).
Overall, our results are robust and the main conclusions of this study remain valid for IV
estimations and for restricted samples.
5 Conclusions
There is a growing literature on the political economy of budgeting. While there is a broad
empirical evidence for the factors influencing budget forecast errors, few studies have explicitly
tested the impact of these errors on either fiscal outcome or election results. Nevertheless,
politicians aim for reelection and use all the tools at their disposal in order to increase their
reelection chances. Thus, this paper examines the impact of budget forecast errors on election
results.
To this end, we analyze initial budget data of all 308 Portuguese municipalities from 1998
to 2017, and bring evidence that incumbent mayors use forecasts to set voters’ expectations.
Overall, we find that budget forecast manipulations, especially of total and capital expenditures,
can be used to increase incumbents’ vote shares.
This paper contributes to the literature by shedding light on fiscal forecasting as an electoral
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tool for politicians. There are two strategies politicians can follow. First, they can make
pessimistic forecasts in order to end up with a surplus or be able to spend more; showing that
they are responsible fiscal managers. Second, they can build optimistic forecasts in order to
be able to promise more expenditures. In that case, they end up with a deficit and can be
punished if voters are fiscal conservatives.
The second strategy is the one followed by Portuguese municipalities, as they generally over-
state revenues in order to increase their margin of maneuver to spend more. Our results provide
little or no empirical evidence for a penalization of this opportunistic revenue overestimation.
On the other hand, there is robust evidence that opportunistic management of expenditure
forecasts pays off.
Another contribution of this paper is to look at disaggregated fiscal data. This helps to
identify which budget components are more manipulated and moreover influence electoral out-
comes. The results indicate that it is mainly the opportunistic manipulation of total and capital
expenditures that can be used to increase vote shares of incumbent mayors. This result is robust
to a series of robustness checks and is in line with previous findings of Veiga and Veiga (2007b)
and Aidt et al. (2011), who show that increased total and capital expenditures in election years
lead to greater vote shares for parties of the incumbent Portuguese mayors.
Regarding the effects of other variables, the results show that vote shares are positively
related to left-wing incumbents and larger win margins in the previous elections, while more
terms in office, party similarity with the national government, and higher unemployment rates
are associated with lower vote shares.
Some lessons for improving forecast institutions can be taken from this study. Opportunistic
management of budget forecasts is likely to happen when it is easy for local governments
to approve their budgets without negotiations with opposition parties, as is the case in the
vast majority (about 80%) of Portuguese municipalities. Given the incentives to implement
opportunistic policies, in the absence of strict fiscal rules, more political room of maneuver
will likely result in more opportunism. This could be counteracted by changing the electoral
system in a way that led to a smaller share of majorities (as happens in French departments) or,
perhaps more effectively, by tightening fiscal rules. Not allowing commitments for expenditures
if the required revenues are not guaranteed, a rule introduced in Portugal during the Economic
Adjustment Program funded by the EU and the IMF, is one possibility. Alternatively, one could
penalize local governments that clearly overestimate revenues, or set more effective balanced
budget rules, coupled with severe restrictions to the accumulation of debt.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of votes of the incumbent mayor’s party 1170 51.69 10.79 1.12 83.12
Reelection 1170 0.55 0.5 0 1
PFE-Effective Revenue 1160 -54.52 47.97 -456.1 25.32
PFE Current Revenue 1160 -12.47 21.74 -208.46 30.29
PFE-Capital Revenue 1160 -204.3 219.5 -3290.47 61.56
PFE-Direct taxes 1160 -5.22 32.43 -348.01 71.99
PFE-Total Expenditure 1138 -48.87 43.07 -387.56 81.65
PFE-Current Expenditure 1138 -13.2 20.07 -241.57 45.57
PFE-Capital Expenditure 1138 -105.13 99.79 -941.55 93.48
Left wing 1170 0.54 0.5 0 1
Majority 1170 0.8 0.4 0 1
Terms in office 1170 1.99 1.51 0 9
Government party 1170 0.42 0.49 0 1
Unemployment rate 1170 6.54 2.78 .93 17.4
Regional GDP growth 1170 0.92 3.92 -11.27 9.45
Budget stress 1170 1.2 10.33 -51.69 40.26
Population density 1170 4.39 1.45 1.46 8.93
Win Margin in the previous election 1170 51.64 8.63 26.83 83.12
Sources: Directorate General of Local Authorities (DGAL), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI),
and National Institute of Statistics (INE).
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B Robustness Tests
Table B.2: Impact of forecast errors on the vote shares of incumbents (without the 2009 and
2013 elections)
Dependent variable Vote shares of the party of the incumbent mayor
Municipal Revenues Expenditures Rev. & Exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PFE Effective revenue 0.024** 0.011
(0.010) (0.022)
PFE Current revenue 0.030
(0.029)
PFE Capital revenue 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
PFE Direct taxes 0.010
(0.013)
PFE Total expenditure 0.029** 0.017
(0.013) (0.026)
PFE Current expenditure -0.009
(0.029)
PFE Capital expenditure 0.017***
(0.004)
Left wing -4.687 -4.379 -4.276 -4.531 -4.693 -4.473
(2.978) (3.012) (3.010) (3.055) (3.079) (3.024)
Majority 0.026 0.012 0.090 -0.277 -0.371 -0.300
(1.473) (1.469) (1.469) (1.472) (1.469) (1.484)
Terms in office -0.892** -0.995** -1.018*** -1.072*** -1.075*** -1.053**
(0.398) (0.388) (0.389) (0.409) (0.402) (0.412)
Government party 5.318* 5.214* 5.210* 4.890* 4.906* 4.989*
(2.860) (2.914) (2.919) (2.909) (2.952) (2.892)
Unemployment rate -0.067 0.011 0.026 -0.291 -0.239 -0.246
(0.273) (0.270) (0.269) (0.273) (0.266) (0.276)
Regional GDP growth -0.028 -0.004 -0.010 -0.048 -0.052 -0.060
(0.160) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162)
Budget stress -0.047 -0.026 -0.023 -0.036 -0.039 -0.037
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)
Population density 3.054 0.510 1.068 5.300 4.911 6.284
(6.114) (6.076) (6.101) (6.339) (6.183) (6.274)
Win Margin in the previous election 0.406*** 0.402*** 0.398*** 0.398*** 0.395*** 0.382***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Constant 21.281 31.558 28.937 13.982 15.952 10.317
(27.733) (27.734) (27.787) (28.733) (28.138) (28.507)
Observations 768 769 769 747 747 745
Adjusted-R2 0.1040 0.0984 0.0974 0.1034 0.1125 0.0957
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity
in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table B.3: Impact of forecast errors on the vote shares of incumbents (until the 2009 election)
Dependent variable Vote shares of the party of the incumbent mayor
Municipal Revenues Expenditures Rev. & Exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PFE Effective revenue 0.020** 0.006
(0.010) (0.018)
PFE Current revenue 0.007
(0.026)
PFE Capital revenue 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
PFE Direct taxes 0.013
(0.010)
PFE Total expenditure 0.027** 0.022
(0.011) (0.021)
PFE Current expenditure -0.006
(0.028)
PFE Capital expenditure 0.011**
(0.005)
Left wing -4.158 -4.078 -3.936 -3.965 -4.214 -4.007
(4.123) (4.153) (4.163) (4.125) (4.125) (4.123)
Majority 0.787 0.555 0.686 0.718 0.647 0.756
(1.441) (1.466) (1.469) (1.471) (1.476) (1.450)
Terms in office -1.770*** -1.742*** -1.735*** -1.823*** -1.789*** -1.814***
(0.441) (0.451) (0.439) (0.444) (0.447) (0.444)
Government party 0.454 0.620 0.533 0.357 0.500 0.352
(3.591) (3.626) (3.612) (3.597) (3.594) (3.596)
Unemployment rate -0.120 -0.148 -0.141 -0.109 -0.042 -0.107
(0.357) (0.360) (0.361) (0.361) (0.365) (0.361)
Regional GDP growth -0.290** -0.299** -0.306** -0.263** -0.270** -0.269**
(0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.118) (0.120) (0.119)
Budget stress -0.052 -0.048 -0.048 -0.057 -0.060 -0.056
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
Population density 1.500 0.927 1.271 1.658 0.710 1.694
(8.041) (8.352) (8.324) (7.981) (7.970) (8.001)
Win Margin in the previous election 0.115 0.121 0.117 0.119 0.116 0.118
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Constant 47.092 48.266 46.850 46.371 50.032 46.357
(36.299) (37.632) (37.501) (36.050) (36.068) (36.108)
Observations 754 754 754 754 754 754
Adjusted-R2 0.0800 0.0720 0.0748 0.0822 0.0816 0.0812
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity
in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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